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More needs to be done to improve safety and quality and
to manage risks in health care. Existing processes are
fragmented and there is no single comprehensive source of
information about what goes wrong. An integrated
framework for the management of safety, quality and risk
is needed, with an information and incident management
system based on a universal patient safety classification.
The World Alliance for Patient Safety provides a platform
for the development of a coherent approach; 43 desirable
attributes for such an approach are discussed. An example
of an incident management and information system serving
a patient safety classification is presented, with a brief
account of how and where it is currently used. Any such
system is valueless unless it improves safety and quality.
Quadruple-loop learning (personal, local, national and
international) is proposed with examples of how an
exemplar system has been successfully used at the various
levels. There is currently an opportunity to ‘‘get it right’’ by
international cooperation via the World Health
Organization to develop an integrated framework
incorporating systems that can accommodate information
from all sources, manage and monitor things that go
wrong, and allow the worldwide sharing of information
and the dissemination of tools for the implementation of
strategies which have been shown to work.
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I
n the last decade there has been a growing
awareness that errors and failures in the
delivery of health care are far more common
and serious than the recipients, providers, and
funders of health care would like.1–3 It seems
that, on average, the most appropriate health
care is delivered not much more than half the
time,4 5 and that at least one in 10 admissions to
acute care hospitals is associated with some sort
of iatrogenic harm.6–12 Although there has been
debate about the accuracy of these estimates,13
observational studies have confirmed that things
do go wrong with alarming frequency.14 15 There
is widespread confusion, with some health
services having patient safety officers, risk
managers, quality improvement practitioners, a
nosocomial infection unit, epidemiologists, and
more, with as many as 15 different reporting
and/or management systems all doing essentially
the same thing but using different paradigms.
There is no single source of information that
can provide a comprehensive picture of the safety
and quality of health care, and existing sources—
many rich in information—are not systemati-
cally exploited to provide structured information
that is useful for finding out about what is
actually being done or how and why things go
wrong.16 17 Both are necessary if we are to move
towards delivering ‘‘best practice’’ health care
and devise effective preventive and corrective
strategies for things that go wrong.
An integrated framework is needed that can
operate across the entire spectrum of health care
from local to national, and a full range of
administrative arrangements. Such a framework,
integrating safety, quality and risk management,
is presented in fig 1. It includes the conventional
medical record and ancillary information about
patients, investigations and procedures, a system
for logging, managing and monitoring progress
when things go wrong, a data repository for
collating information from all available sources,
and a risk management framework underpin-
ning both proactive and reactive responses.
Central to this is a comprehensive universal
classification supported by a system for eliciting,
capturing, classifying, and analysing the infor-
mation needed to improve the safety and quality
of health care.
Safety is just one of the dimensions of the
quality of health care, with access, timeliness,
efficacy, efficiency, appropriateness and accept-
ability. Safety cannot be considered in isolation
as resources spent on safety cannot be spent on
other aspects of quality. Although some of the
activities and information sources in fig 1 are
useful for some of the other aspects of quality,
the discussion in this paper will be directed
towards safety and things that go wrong.
We have previously identified the need for ‘‘an
international patient safety reference group to
align terminology, tools and classification sys-
tems and to promote the rapid dissemination of
strategies that prove to be successful’’.16 Also
needed is the ability to aggregate large amounts
of information and compare patterns and trends
over time and between individuals, organizations
and countries, so that detailed pictures can be
obtained of the individually rare but collectively
important problems that make up the bulk of the
things that go wrong.18
A platform from which to do this was
established with the launch of the World
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Alliance for Patient Safety in October 2004. Two of its six
early initiatives are relevant to this paper, ‘‘Developing a
patient safety taxonomy’’ and ‘‘Reporting and learning to
improve patient safety’’.19 While it is essential for a
classification and reporting and learning systems to be able
to stand alone and function locally, we will propose here that
the future lies in an integrated approach. Such an approach is
shown in fig 1. The salient features of this figure are referred
to below in bold text. Each of these represents an important
activity but, as discussion about most is beyond the scope of
this paper, a few key references have been provided.
At the apex of the pyramid in fig 1 an asterisk represents
an intervention (diagnostic or therapeutic) or an incident
(an event or circumstance that could have or did harm
anyone, or cause loss or damage).20 The first thing to do is to
respond, and then record what happened and/or was done.
Records: The causes of the underlying diseases or injuries
may be coded on discharge or death using the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD),21 and procedures may be
coded using the International Classification for Healthcare
Interventions (ICHI).22 Subsets may be aggregated for special
purposes. For example, identifying ‘‘diagnostic related
groups’’ for reimbursement purposes or extracting informa-
tion for registers (such as for cardiothoracic procedures or
renal transplantation).23 Information may also be extracted
for indicators,24 audits,25 and reviews26 of activity, morbid-
ity and mortality. Subsets of laboratory and other results can
be studied for activities such as the surveillance and tracking
of nosocomial infection,27 and triggers may be used to
identify certain types of problems.28
If an incident has resulted in harm, those affected
(patients, staff, and their families and friends) should be
informed of the facts (disclose),29 and arrangements made
to look after them (support).30
Basic data: For all significant or informative incidents,
and especially when harm has occurred, basic data (what,
who, when, where, risk, consequences) should be logged so
that it can be passed on to the relevant people (notify), so
that they can recommend and/or take the necessary local
action. This process should also elicit sufficient information
to generate a risk matrix or assessment to determine
whether further investigation and/or remedial steps are
needed.31 The kinds of people who should be notified are
shown in table 1.
In most jurisdictions there are regulations which safeguard
the privacy of patients, and a good general rule is that
identifiers should not be passed on to anyone unless consent
has been obtained or this is necessary for the immediate care
of the person affected.32
A process should be undertaken to determine if there is
culpability and, if there is, an enquiry should be commis-
sioned and appropriate action taken (including informing
those affected about this process and its outcome).33 34 Other
processes may be invoked such as a complaint,35 medico-
legal36 or Coroners’ report,37 or a report to a drug or device
agency.38–41 If the event has caused harm or a recurrence
would pose a significant risk, details should be elicited,
classified and stored, using a universal patient safety
classification. Details may be elicited by a reporter going
‘‘online’’, by a patient safety officer (PSO) or call centre;
high risk incidents should be subjected to a root cause
analysis.42 43 Details of the universal classification will be
discussed below. Knowledge from all available sources,
including the literature, surveys and observation studies,
and evidence from all levels including consensus meetings,
guidelines and protocols make up the patient safety
data repository. This information can then be used to
Figure 1 Quality and safety activities and quadruple-loop learning.
The labels and abbreviations in the figure are discussed where
highlighted in bold in the text. The shaded areas are part of an
integrated system which will be discussed later in the paper.
Table 1 Examples of people who may be sent
a copy of the notification
Reason for and type of
notification Who is notified
Administrative, formal
notification
Line manager and/or head
of department
Potential litigation Risk manager and/or
medical defence
organization
Medication incident Pharmacy department and/
or national drug reporting
body
Equipment problem Biomedical engineer and/or
national devices reporting
body
Infrastructure problem Building and engineering
services
Infection control problem Infection control team
Staff member harmed Occupational health and
safety system
Visitor or contractor harmed
or damage or loss sustained
Hospital insurer
Adverse publicity is possible Media liaison officer
Criminal offence has been
committed or absconder
could harm him or herself
Police
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understand the context, identify the risks, analyse the
risks, and evaluate the risks in order to treat or manage
the risks.31 Risks that can be dealt with should be subjected
to a quality improvement cycle (plan-do-study-act),44 and
those that cannot should be placed on a risk register31 for
future attention, and accepted and/or indemnified against.
Socio-technical probabilistic risk analysis (ST-PRA)45 and
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)46 represent
proactive approaches to identifying problems and setting
priorities. These quality and safety activities may all
contribute to ‘‘quadruple-loop’’ learning shown on the
side of the pyramid in fig 1 (1, 2, 3, 4).47 This will be
discussed later; an example is given in box 1 at the end of the
paper.
The shaded areas in fig 1 represent activities which are
often managed in a piecemeal manner and which can
currently be handled using an integrated system. We will
outline the desirable attributes of such an integrated solution
from various perspectives, and then describe the patient
safety classification and Advanced Incident Management
System (AIMS) we have developed as examples of compo-
nents of this, with a brief account of how this has driven
system-wide quadruple-loop learning.
DESIRABLE ATTRIBUTES OF AN INTEGRATED
SYSTEM
The system should be accessible, useful and useable.16 17
Experience over two decades has shown that the expectations
of users increase rapidly and that simply collecting basic
information is soon deemed inadequate. Some underlying
principles are shown in table 2. The system should be built on
experience from other high risk industries (including the
underlying information model), and have broad applications
with respect to use, users, and scope. It should interface with
and complement existing systems, classifications, and
sources of information.
The system should be able to be used for managing
incidents at a local level and accommodate local terminology,
language, legal, ethical and privacy requirements, but the
information gathered should also be able to be used at state,
national, and international levels (table 3). It should be able
to interface with existing local systems and be applicable
across all areas of health care.
There is also a set of requirements for those who have to
run or administer the system (table 4). It should be able to be
used reliably in a manner that is safe and secure by having
security and data access controls, audit trails, and software
prompts for complying with ethical, legal and privacy
requirements, and have mechanisms for support and main-
tenance with robust arrangements for troubleshooting and
updating the system.
Attributes important to users are listed in table 5. These
include accessibility and ease of use, not being burdened with
redundant views or information, being able to use the system
to a level of detail appropriate to the incident in question, and
the ability to track the progress of an incident report and any
action taken.
Finally, there are attributes which are important for data
extraction, analysis and reporting which include the
secure but seamless exchange of de-identified information,
Table 2 Desirable attributes of an integrated system:
underlying principles
The system should:
l be based on an underlying information model consistent with those
used in other high risk industries such as aviation, rail, oil rigs, and
nuclear power
l be supported by a comprehensive, universal patient safety
classification
l be able to elicit, classify, store, analyze and manage things that go
wrong (incidents)* across the entire spectrum of health care from near
misses to adverse` or sentinel events1
l be able to accommodate information from all available sources
l be populated by concepts shown to be needed from ‘‘real world’’
data
l be expansible as needs for new concepts become evident
l be able to collect information without being constrained by definitions
about the type of event or circumstance
l be able to be used by funders, administrators, providers, carers,
patients, and other clients or consumers
l complement other members of the Family of International
Classifications of the World Health Organization by incorporating
subsets of concepts or cross-mapping directly where relevant
Notes on terms:20
*Incident: any event or circumstance which could have or did harm
anyone or which resulted in a complaint, loss or damage.
Near miss: an incident which did not harm anyone or lead to a
complaint, loss or damage.
`Adverse event: an incident which harmed a patient.
1Sentinel event: an adverse event which definitely should not have
occurred.
For example, it does not matter whether different jurisdictions have
different definitions for a near miss. One might regard a near miss as an
incident without any adverse outcome, and another might regard a near
miss as an incident that was intercepted before the sequence of actions
was completed. If the actual information about what happened is
collected, then such definitions can be applied retrospectively in the
relevant jurisdiction and need not bother a reporter or classifier, nor
constrain what is collected.
Table 3 Desirable attributes of an integrated system:
from a state, national, or international perspective
The system should:
l be able to be presented using local terminology and in different
languages, using terms which are commonly used and understood in
that particular region or jurisdiction
l be customisable so that it can take account of legal, ethical, and
privacy requirements which may vary from region to region
l be able to be used in conjunction with existing ‘‘home grown’’ or
proprietary systems for importing or collecting data by using
‘‘mapping’’ interfaces
l be able to be used in a variety of ways suitable for ‘‘developing’’,
‘‘transitional’’, and ‘‘developed’’ countries
l be able to be used in such a way as to be able to elicit and capture
simple basic sets of information as well as complicated detailed sets of
information about all the components of the underlying information
model
l be able to be applied across all of health care from self-care and
domiciliary care through to high technology intensive care and
transport of the critically ill
l be able to have additional streams of local relevance—for example,
accommodating various forms of alternative or herbal medicine
l allow the use of locally approved ‘‘reference lists’’ for items such as
drugs and devices
Table 4 Desirable attributes of an integrated system:
from the perspective of local administrators
The system should:
l allow for anonymous reporting and for high level confidentiality
l have mechanisms for authenticating quality control with respect to
reliability and validity
l have comprehensive flexible security, allowing access to data and for
fields to be user specific
l have comprehensive audit trails
l be able to guide users and facilitate compliance with statutory
immunity and privacy requirements, wherever relevant
l allow for comparisons between like units across a jurisdiction, with
the identity of the other like units being masked
l have explicit arrangements for support, backup, maintenance, and
updating
l have suitable mechanisms for communicating information about
‘‘bugs’’ and desired enhancements
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statistical analyses, the ability to track trends and patterns,
and standard as well as customised reports (table 6).
A COMPREHENSIVE UNIVERSAL PATIENT
CLASSIFICATION
The need for a comprehensive universal patient safety
classification with agreed definitions for the concepts which
populate it, and preferred terms for these concepts, has been
identified by ourselves and others.16 17 The Australian Patient
Safety Foundation has been developing such a classification
since 1988.48 From 1988 to 1993 several thousand ‘‘key
words’’ were assembled and used in the analysis of the first
2000 incidents reported to an Australian anaesthesia based
incident reporting system.49 From 1993 the concepts of
natural categories and natural mapping were incorporated
into a hierarchical system called the Generic Occurrence
Classification (GOC) which had some 12 400 ‘‘natural
categories’’.50 This was developed to explain the apparent
fivefold difference in the rate of adverse events in the US and
Australia, when studies in both countries had used ostensibly
identical methods.6 7 18 It was successful in doing this by
showing that the numbers and types of serious events were
virtually identical in the two countries, with the discrepancy
being made up by many minor or late complications which
were apparently not counted by the US reviewers. However,
the GOC had structural limitations and analysis was labour
intensive.
An architecture was needed which could elicit patient
safety information about any area of health care from a wide
range of sources, and translate it into a common language so
that electronic records could be created which could be
compared with each other and analysed as part of a larger set
of data. A classification was needed to ‘‘de-construct’’ the
information in a way that would facilitate subsequent
analysis and learning. An underlying information model for
such a classification was developed, the Generic Reference
Model (GRM), which is based on the model of complex
system failure described by Rasmussen51 and Reason.52 It
provides a structured approach to drawing out all the relevant
information about an incident and underpins the overall
process of collecting and classifying information.
The GRM is shown in fig 2. It was developed to provide a
framework to define the relationships between components
(classes) of the classification system and the terms which are
used to describe the attributes of each of these components
(the concepts).53
There are five levels of information underlying the GRM:
N information sources;
N incident types;
N components (data elements, classes);
N attributes (concepts); and
N terms.
Information sources
The GRM can accommodate information that has been obtained
from all available sources including incident reports, complaints,
medicolegal cases, root cause analyses, Coroners’ investigations,
enquiries, and any other account of an event or circumstance
relevant to patient safety from any area of health care.16 Root
cause analysis is particularly useful in that an important
component of participant and organizational learning occurs
just from the process of performing root cause analyses.54
Healthcare incident types
Incidents are divided into types and the GRM is used to derive a
‘‘specific incident reference model’’ for each healthcare incident
type (HIT) (see table 7 for a list of the basic and some of the
specialty HITs that have been developed; more are planned).
Each incident may be classified using one or more HIT. For
example, an overdose of morphine in an intensive care
patient because of malfunction of an infusion pump would be
classified using medication, therapeutic device and intensive care
HITs. When an incident is classified using more than one
incident type, the user needs to identify the ‘‘principal
incident type’’ in order to allow the production of ‘‘enu-
merative’’ reports.
Each HIT has its own components, such as contributing
factors, preventive factors and mitigating factors. For
example, in the therapeutic device HIT indicated above
(pump malfunction), contributing factors might have been a
design fault in an infusion pump as well as a problem
resulting from it being set up by an inexperienced nurse,
whereas a poor outcome from the medication problem
(morphine overdose) may have been due to a shortage of
staff. If two or more incidents are associated with each other,
they may be linked.
Components
Each specific incident reference model includes most, but not
necessarily all, of the components of the GRM. Each
component is represented by a box in fig 2. The specific
incident reference models constitute the underlying informa-
tion models for each incident type. Some components or
concepts have attributes specific to each incident type, such
as ‘‘what happened?’’
Table 5 Desirable attributes of an integrated system:
from the perspective of users
The system should:
l allow for use at a basic or superficial level, as well as for in-depth
deconstruction and detailed descriptions, to facilitate a deep
understanding of things that go wrong
l be modular so that people do not need to access or view aspects
which are of no use to them
l present relevant data to the user depending on their area of interest
l have the capacity to allow free text when information captured by the
‘‘tick boxes’’ is not sufficient
l be able to link the relevant contributing or mitigating factors to each
aspect of something that goes wrong
l provide definitions, rules, and, where necessary, examples of the
concepts on the same computer screen
l be practical, intuitive, easy to use, and require limited training
l allow users to go online and see what has happened to an incident
they reported
l provide regular feedback
l have adaptive shortcuts tailored to the needs of particular disciplines
or areas of health care
l be accessible and easy to use with alternatives such as the reporter
entering information directly online or communicating with someone
who has access to the software, such as a patient safety officer or call
centre operator
Table 6 Desirable attributes of an integrated system:
from the perspective of analysing, reporting, and
disseminating information
The system should:
l be secure but allow the seamless exchange of de-identified
information between centres and countries
l allow outcomes from the system to be analysed statistically
l be able to produce regular reports tailored to the needs of various
groups
l be able to track trends and patterns and allow comparisons between
units, facilities, or jurisdictions and be able to track trends over time
l cater for standard reports but also allow the construction of detailed
queries
l allow detailed reporting on the attributes of all the components of the
underlying information model
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Attributes
To characterize the attributes of the components of the
reference model which are relevant to a particular incident
type, each represented by a concept, the classification process
prompts classifiers to select the attributes of an incident by
responding to cascades of relevant and intuitively arranged
‘‘plain language’’ questions. The answers (concepts) are
labelled by preferred ‘‘terms’’. These can vary from area to
area or from country to country. For example, the mobile
bed-like device upon which patients are placed for transport
around a hospital is variously called a ‘‘trolley’’, a ‘‘stretcher’’,
a ‘‘barouche’’, or a ‘‘gurney’’ in different jurisdictions.
Further terms would obviously be used in different
languages. Each concept is labelled by an alphanumeric
code, making the system language independent as the
underlying concepts remain the same.
Terms
The terms (representing concepts) which are presented to the
classifier as possible answers to classification questions were
collected from experience of classifying over 100 000 inci-
dents, from the original GOC, and from searches of relevant
medical literature and include certain ‘‘controlled vocabul-
aries’’ such as the ECRI list of equipment and devices.55 These
terms may be reviewed, revised, and expanded as necessary.
There are currently some 20 000 terms.
ADVANCED INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The Advanced Incident Management System (AIMS) system
is briefly presented here as an example of an attempt to meet
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Figure 2 The Generic Reference Model (GRM) which underlies the universal patient safety classification.
Table 7 Healthcare incident types (HITs)
Therapeutic agents
l Medication and intravenous fluids
l Oxygen, gases and vapours
l Blood and blood products
l Nutrition
Equipment and infrastructure
l Medical devices, equipment and property
l Buildings, fittings, fixtures and surrounds
Physical harm and occupational health and safety
l Falls
l Pressure ulcers
l Accidents and occupational health and safety




l Healthcare associated infections
Corporate management and security
l Organization, management and services
l Security
Behavior, human performance and aggression
l Behavior and human performance
l Aggression – victim





l Obstetric – fetal
l Obstetric – maternal
l Primary care
i86 Runciman, Williamson, Deakin, et al
www.qshc.com
 on 26 November 2007 qshc.bmj.comDownloaded from 
the needs identified in tables 2–6 and is currently being
redesigned to be a browser based system. It has evolved
progressively in response to feedback from users, and is
undergoing progression evaluation with respect to validity
and reliability. The system provides software to facilitate the
functions and activities shown in the shaded areas of fig 1;
basic data may be entered and classified into a customisable
electronic form, the relevant people notified (table 1), and the
local actions recommended and taken can be logged. This
may be by a person other than the person who entered the
initial data. Risk assessment is presented as a score in a 565
matrix based on severity and likelihood of recurrence.31 42 If
the risk is low and the incident is of local relevance only, this
may be all that needs to be done. However, if the risk is high
or someone has been harmed, a patient safety officer or line
manager may decide to elicit more information and classify
the incident in detail. At this stage culpability should be ruled
out and the necessary steps taken to ensure statutory immunity,
if this is available.33 34 Eliciting detailed information and
classifying it using the classification may be done by a reporter
directly interfacing with the AIMS software or, more usually, by
communication with a patient safety officer or call centre
operator who has access to the software at the time of the
interview. The essence of eliciting and classifying the informa-
tion is captured in using the HIT screens.
Using healthcare incident type screens
During basic data entry the relevant HITs would have been
chosen, which may be accessed in turn. Each HIT screen
elicits comprehensive information which is specifically
related to the type of incident, and constitutes an enormous
electronic form. The intuitive cascading question-answer
format makes the classification process easy, reducing the
amount of training required for classifiers and increasing the
consistency of classification. For each HIT screen, classifiers
are presented with a series of plain language questions. For
each question, the classifier is offered a choice of plain
language terms as answers. A definition of the concept
underlying each term (with an example, if necessary) appears
on the screen for each question. In this way the relevant
information about the particular incident is drawn out or
elicited. Some answers may trigger cascades of further
questions to obtain more detailed information (fig 3). This
process is designed to extract all the relevant features of an
incident by eliciting all the attributes of each component
shown in fig 2. Where there are insufficient choices to do
this, the system always offers the option of using ‘‘free
narrative’’. An example of a small segment of some queries
with a set of answers is shown in fig 3.
The AIMS suite of software tools
The current iteration of the system is made up of a suite of
tools shown in fig 4. The six modules which make up the







Figure 3 Example of a question-answer cascade. A small segment of questions and answers from the ‘‘blood and blood product’’ HIT from South
Australia (population 1.5 million) for the period January 2004 to January 2005.
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Figure 4 Advanced Incident Management System (AIMS) modules. The
six modules which make up the AIMS suite of software tools are
discussed in the text.
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Data Manager accommodates data entry, data manage-
ment, and classification tools that allow records of incidents
or events from any source to be created and managed. It
elicits information by asking a series of questions which,
when answered, is stored in the appropriate place in the
patient safety classification, in a database from which it can
subsequently be retrieved. It is also the portal to the workflow
and risk register modules. Data manager can copy, edit, and
link incidents and notify people via email about workflow
tasks.
The Workflow module allows electronic notification of
basic data to all relevant personnel within an organization
and allows workflows (projects) to be designed and set up
which consist of a series of tasks which can be assigned to
staff to complete within an allocated timeframe. Root cause
analyses can be managed using workflow. Progress can be
monitored and escalating reminders can be set up so that,
when a task has been overdue for a pre-determined time,
additional people can be notified.
Analyser accommodates analysis and reporting tools.
Standard records can be generated to compare information
over time and to compare between units or organizations.
Incident patterns which vary from the norm can be detected,
which may trigger investigations and/or remedial action
where appropriate. Changes in patterns can also be docu-
mented when interventions have been successfully imple-
mented, together with a display of any new sets of problems
which might have emerged as a result of implementation.
Comparisons can be generated at a variety of levels from unit
or ward up to national or international levels. It is possible to
design reports to search on specific terms or on combinations
of terms by organization(s) or by date(s). The capacity to
‘‘slice and dice’’ the data supports a thorough analysis. Each
incident making up a set can be examined and/or printed
(‘‘drill down’’).
Administrator is a tool for configuring and managing the
AIMS system within a jurisdiction or organization. The first
task is to build and maintain the organizational hierarchy
(tree) for reporting by location of incident. It is necessary to
determine who has permission to access the software suite
and what each user can see and do (security and user access).
It allows certain data fields to be set as ‘‘identified’’ or ‘‘de-
identified’’. An incident comparison can be entered and
customised user defined fields can be created. It can also be
used to set up notifications for AIMS users, and to set up
special projects to allow staff involved in particular projects to
have access to certain relevant information over and above
the incidents their normal security permissions allow them to
access. Audit trails can be viewed allowing user verification
and reconstruction of how, when, and by whom the
information was entered. Administrator can also be used to
amend and update HITs.
The Database Administrator allows configuration and
maintenance of the database and updates to be downloaded
and applied to the AIMS software suite. De-identified
classified data can also be uploaded (imported) to a central
agent for incorporation on national or international data-
bases, and data can be exported. Such data are de-identified
and encrypted before transmission.
Risk Register: risks can be entered with their controls
and treatments allowing managers to view the overall
exposure to risks that have been identified. These can be
assessed with respect to the impact they may have on the
ability to deliver objectives, products, and services and allow
regular audits to monitor current exposure to risk.
Current AIMS usage
AIMS is currently in use across the universal public health
system in five of the eight states and territories of Australia
(accounting for some 60% of the population of Australia),
with additional sites in other states and in New Zealand, and
a pilot site in the USA. AIMS is being used for research































Figure 5 Options for the configuration of AIMS software.
Box 1 An example of quadruple-loop learning:
oximetry and capnography in anaesthesia
In the mid to late 1980s individual anaesthetists started using
oximetry (which allows heartbeat-by-heartbeat monitoring of
the oxygen saturation of haemoglobin) and capnography
(which allows breath-by breath monitoring of carbon
dioxide). The applications and limitations of these techniques
were discussed at unit or departmental level (single-loop
learning). Unit and departmental managers then tried to
have these devices introduced for every case. This was
resisted by hospital managers on the grounds of expense,
and there was only partial success in achieving double-loop
learning. In Australia a national meeting was then called and
a symposium issue of the journal Anaesthesia and Intensive
Care was produced which called for national monitoring
standards.61 62 The Australian and New Zealand College of
Anaesthetists then effectively mandated the use of oximetry
and capnography, requiring the exclusive use of these
devices for every case (triple-loop learning).63 All of this
was supported by Advanced Incident Management System
(AIMS) data which was coming in from anaesthetists in both
these countries from mid 1988. In 1993 a symposium issue
was produced in which analyses of the first 2000 incidents
reported to AIMS were presented.49 These showed that half of
all incidents under anaesthesia were first detected by a
monitor, and the combination of oximetry and capnography
would have detected 90% of these.64 This information had a
major impact on the International Standard for Anaesthesia
Safety which was endorsed by the World Federation of
Societies of Anaesthesiologists (with about 100 member
countries) at a meeting in the Hague in 1994.65–67 Feedback
at subsequent meetings of this Federation has confirmed that
these standards had a major impact in influencing countries
to purchase monitoring devices ahead of equipment which
previously would have taken precedent, such as compressed
gas anaesthetic machines. In a recent review of 4000
incidents and more than 1200 medicolegal files there were
no cases of brain damage or death due to undetected
oesophageal intubation or inadequate ventilation during
anaesthesia in Australia over 5 years, in marked contrast to
the situation which prevailed before the introduction of
oximetry and capnography.68
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data from a number of sources at a number of levels of
functionality (fig 5). In Australia between 10 000 and 20 000
incidents are reported per million population each year; there
are also speciality-specific collections of over 10 000 incidents
in areas such as anaesthesia and intensive care. What
matters, of course, is whether lessons are being learnt and
applied as a result of its use.
QUADRUPLE-LOOP LEARNING
The notion of single, double and triple-loop learning has been
described by Argyris and Schon56 and by Parker,57 and the
concept extended to quadruple-loop learning by Braithwaite
et al.47 Single-loop learning occurs when clinicians or local
managers learn from experience and take their own
initiatives to follow up problems that have occurred, usually
within existing paradigms and rules. This is represented in
AIMS by the responses to individual incidents or problems.
Double-loop learning occurs when the lessons learnt from
such events are taken up by managers at a departmental or
institutional level and change the rules or preferences; this
may be prompted by a cluster of incidents with similar
contributing factors. For example, many problems have been
shown to occur because of the availability of a wide range of
infusion pumps and many institutions have now put into
place systematic processes for choosing, purchasing, and
maintaining infusion pumps, with better protocols for their
use and credentialling of users.58 Triple-loop learning occurs
when a regulator such as a health department, specialist
college, or accreditation agency learns from double-loop
experiences and disseminates guidelines or changes practice
at a jurisdictional or national level. Quadruple-loop learning
occurs when these lessons are disseminated internationally
and taken up or incorporated into standards. The AIMS
system has been set up so that there can be as many learning
loops as the organizational structure allows. For example, in
Western Australia there are 14 levels from sub-ward level to
state level and data can be aggregated at each of these.
Single-loop learning is documented by the AIMS system tens
of thousands of times a year in Australia. Examples of double
and triple-loop learning are provided by regular feedback,
newsletters, and published articles; over 110 papers have
been published using AIMS data.59 60 An example of quad-
ruple-loop learning driven by AIMS data over a decade ago is
shown in box 1.
WHERE TO NOW?
It has now been recognized that systematic efforts will be
required to ‘‘get it right’’ in health care19 and that information
will need to be collected from many sources.16 69 However,
efforts are fragmented and are not underpinned by a
coherent body of relevant information. Information currently
has to be gathered ‘‘manually’’ from a wide range of
sources.70 Reporting systems which cannot capture detailed
information or contribute usefully to a detailed database are
of low value and have poor ‘‘buy in’’.71 With the launch of the
World Alliance for Patient Safety19 there is an opportunity to
develop high value systems with the attributes listed in
tables 2–6 within an integrated framework for safety, quality,
and risk management. This will require appropriate attention
to meeting requirements for interoperability and electronic
messaging. It will also require the development of a universal
patient safety classification which can be integrated into
existing and new information systems. This must be
accessible, usable, and useful, and should have the capacity
to interactively elicit complete sets of information about all
the components of the underlying information model. It
must allow aggregation of information at many levels to
support quadruple-loop learning from the bedside to inter-
national level. The internal structural properties and data
relationships must be developed so that the complete package
is future-proofed. Developments and enhancements to the
classification must comply with best practice in information
modelling, system design, and terminology development and
management. The Australian Patient Safety Foundation has
been commissioned to develop the underlying information
model for an international patient safety classification, and a
Delphi process seeking worldwide input from all WHO
member countries for the concepts that populate such a
model will have been initiated by the time this paper goes to
press. There is no doubt that, with advances in health care,
there will be always be new ways in which things will go
wrong, but with appropriate integrated systems and mechan-
isms for disseminating information, a near miss in one part
of the world should be able to be prevented from turning into
a dreadful event in any other part of the world.
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